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PLENARY POWER IS DEAD! 
LONG LIVE PLENARY POWER! 
Michael Kagan* 
For decades, scholars of immigration law have anticipated the demise of 
the plenary power doctrine. The Supreme Court could have accomplished 
this in its recent decision in Kerry v. Din, or it could have reaffirmed 
plenary power. Instead, the Court produced a splintered decision that did 
neither. This Essay examines the long process of attrition that has 
significantly gutted the traditional plenary power doctrine with regard to 
procedural due process, while leaving it largely intact with regard to 
substantive constitutional rights. 
 
June 15, 2015 could have been a momentous day in the evolution of 
American immigration law. This was the day the Supreme Court announced 
its decision in Kerry v. Din,1 a case in which a U.S. citizen, Fauzia Din, 
challenged the State Department’s refusal to grant a visa to her Afghan 
husband, Kanishka Berashk, effectively refusing the couple the right to live 
together.2 Din argued that the visa denial infringed her right to marriage, 
and as a matter of due process, the State Department owed her a specific 
explanation for the decision.3 The State Department had given no 
explanation except for a vague reference to the statute banning people who 
have engaged in terrorist activities from entering the United States.4 Din did 
not ask the Court to rule on whether her husband actually was a terrorist.5 
Rather, she asked for a process that would meaningfully allow the couple to 
respond to the allegations.6 
 
 * Associate Professor of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, William S. Boyd 
School of Law.  
 1. 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015) (plurality opinion). 
 2. Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2131. For an explanation as to why the couple could not live 
anywhere but in the United States, see Elizabeth Keyes, Symposium on Kerry v. Din: Another 
Choiceless Choice, IMMIGRATIONPROF BLOG (June 16, 2015), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com 
/immigration/2015/06/symposium-on-kerry-v-din-another-choiceless-choice-by-elizabeth-
keyes.html [http://perma.cc/C5AU-A9LA]. 
 3. Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2131 (plurality opinion). 
 4. Id. at 2139 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 5. See id. at 2132 (plurality opinion). 
 6. Id. 
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Had Din won it would have been a very big deal. In fact, if she had won, 
it might have been possible to state that the plenary power doctrine that has 
long been the foundation of immigration law had finally been overruled. 
That is because the federal government’s plenary authority to regulate 
immigration free from judicial review or constitutional limitations was 
usually assumed to be at its height when a noncitizen had not yet entered the 
country. Sixty-five years ago, in Knauff v. Shaughnessy, the Court 
(in)famously said: ‘‘[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is 
due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.’’7 Ms. Din directly 
challenged that premise, and she did it at a time when there was good reason 
to wonder what was left of the plenary power doctrine. 
Alas, Din did not win. She will not be reunited with her husband, at least 
not by order of the Supreme Court.8 Din’s defeat shows that plenary power is 
not dead yet. But Din came very close, winning four Justices on the Court: 
Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Moreover, her challenge 
severely divided the other five Justices, so much so that there is no 
controlling decision in the case.9 Only two Justices----Justices Kennedy and 
Alito----used an analysis based on the plenary power doctrine as it has been 
traditionally known in immigration law.10 Yet, even they were willing to 
assume for the sake of argument that Din was owed some measure of due 
process.11 The plurality opinion by Justice Scalia largely sidestepped the 
Court’s immigration jurisprudence and focused instead on a critique of 
substantive due process jurisprudence generally.12 
Thus, while Kerry v. Din was not a renunciation of the plenary power 
doctrine, it was not a reaffirmation of the doctrine, either.13 The case is 
therefore an indication that the plenary power doctrine is indeed on fragile 
jurisprudential ground and does not carry the force that it once did. The 
Court’s decision in Kerry v. Din, moreover, is an indication that the Justices 
find it difficult to entirely discard the plenary power doctrine and to fully 
 
 7. U.S. ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950). 
 8. Historically, some spouses of U.S. citizens who have been denied entry to the United 
States on vague security grounds have later won entry through the political branches even after 
losing their cases in the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Charles D. Weisselberg, The Exclusion and 
Detention of Aliens: Lessons from the Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 
933 (1995) (profiling the people involved in the Knauff and Mezei cases). 
 9. See Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (plurality opinion). 
 10. See id. at 2139--41 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 11. See id. at 2139. 
 12. Id. at 2131--38 (plurality opinion). 
 13. Kevin Johnson, Limited Judicial Review of Consular Officer Visa Decisions----
Foreshadowing the Result in the Same-Sex Marriage Case?, SCOTUSBLOG (June 15, 2015, 5:02 
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/opinion-analysis-limited-judicial-review-of-
consular-officer-visa-decisions-foreshadowing-the-result-in-the-same-sex-marriage-case/ 
[http://perma.cc/4NES-CDW8] (‘‘[T]here was no ready defense of the doctrine of consular 
non-reviewability and no aggressive invocation of cases contrary to modern constitutional 
sensibilities such as Knauff and Mezei.’’). 
September 2015] Plenary Power is Dead! 23 
apply normal means of constitutional scrutiny to all aspects of immigration 
law. The Justices may, however, be confused and divided about how to bring 
the doctrine down for a gentle landing. 
This Essay addresses the confusing current state of the plenary power 
doctrine. I first summarize what this doctrine meant as it developed in the 
late nineteenth century and evolved through most of the twentieth century. I 
then outline reasons why recent case law has significantly weakened the 
doctrine. I then suggest reasons why the Court may be hesitant to discard the 
doctrine entirely. I conclude by suggesting paths that the Court may choose 
to take going forward. 
I. THE TRADITIONAL DOCTRINE 
The original challenge of immigration law is that it is not explicitly one 
of the enumerated constitutional powers of the federal government. In the 
Chinese Exclusion Case in 1889, the Supreme Court reasoned that the 
authority to regulate immigration is inherent in national sovereignty and the 
national ‘‘right of self-preservation,’’ rather than stemming from any specific 
constitutional provision.14 Having chosen an extra-constitutional foundation 
for immigration law, the Court quickly came to the conclusion that the 
judiciary had little or no role in reviewing decisions prohibiting foreigners 
from entering the country,15 nor in reviewing decisions to arrest, detain, and 
deport noncitizens who were already inside the country.16 
The result of this sweeping doctrine was that immigration law became ‘‘a 
constitutional oddity’’ (in Professor Legomsky’s words),17 largely immune 
from the civil liberties revolution of the twentieth century.18 By mid-century, 
the Court was willing to approve indefinite detention of a would-be 
immigrant on the theory that noncitizens had no due process rights, 
especially when they were seeking entry.19 However, this exceptional 
approach had foundations that have become jurisprudentially questionable 
in the twenty-first century. One was the court’s tendency to see immigration 
authority as emanating from national sovereignty rather than from the 
Constitution, which seemed to correspond to a reluctance to impose 
constitutional constraints. Another was the nonrecognition of any due 
process rights in immigration cases, based on the theory that immigration 
 
 14. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 604--
06, 608 (1889).  
 15. See, e.g., Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892). 
 16. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 702 (1893). 
 17. Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional 
Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 255. 
 18. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: 
Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 549 (1990). 
 19. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206.  
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was a purely civil matter, and thus did not require the kinds of safeguards 
that the Constitution expected in criminal cases.20 
II. RECENT CRACKS IN THE DOCTRINE 
In 2001, the Supreme Court decided  Zadvydas v. Davis, which presented 
the question of whether the government could indefinitely detain deportable 
noncitizens when the United States was unable to find another country 
willing to take them.21 Half a century earlier, the Court had affirmed 
indefinite detention in somewhat similar circumstances.22 But this time, the 
Court found that the government’s immigration authority ‘‘is subject to 
important constitutional limitations.’’23 The Court also found that even 
deportable immigrants with serious criminal records have a ‘‘liberty interest 
[that] is, at the least, strong enough to raise a serious question as to 
whether . . . the Constitution permits detention that is indefinite and 
potentially permanent.’’24 Even under a fairly narrow reading, Zadvydas 
made clear that procedural due process concerns apply to immigration 
enforcement, at least to the degree that immigration enforcement entails 
deprivations of liberty. But it also opened up a broader question: What other 
constitutional limitations might apply to immigration? 
A significant reason why the Court has become more willing to apply 
procedural due process appears to be that the Court has seen much less 
significance in the formalistic civil-criminal distinction. The Court has 
acknowledged that deportation could be worse than imprisonment for some 
people,25 such that the Sixth Amendment requires defendants in criminal 
cases to be advised about immigration consequences of potential plea 
agreements.26 The Court has analogized pretrial detention in criminal cases 
to pre-removal detention in immigration cases.27 Whereas in the 1950s the 
Court cited the civil-criminal distinction to interpret grounds of deportation 
loosely,28 the Court more recently has adopted a strict categorical approach 
to criminal grounds of deportation, requiring the government to prove every 
 
 20. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 730 (‘‘The order of deportation is not a punishment for 
crime. . . . He has not, therefore, been deprived of life, liberty or property without due process 
of law . . . .’’). 
 21. 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001). 
 22. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 215--16. 
 23. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695. 
 24. Id. at 696. 
 25. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322 (2001); Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 368 
(2010). 
 26. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 356. 
 27. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987). 
 28. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952). 
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element of the deportation ground.29 This change makes grounds of 
deportation much more like offenses in a criminal statute. 
Just as the Court has become more willing to find constitutional 
limitations on immigration enforcement, it has also changed its conception 
of the foundations of that power. The Court continues to hold that the 
federal government has broad immigration authority, but it has more 
recently rooted this authority in constitutionally enumerated powers, 
specifically naturalization, foreign affairs, and the impact on commerce.30 
These two changes----finding both a source and a limit for immigration law 
in the Constitution----push strongly toward normalizing immigration within 
constitutional law.31 
One way to understand the traditional plenary power doctrine is that it 
did not limit immigrant rights so much as it limited judicial review.32 If this 
is correct, then all that is required for immigration exceptionalism to end 
would be for the Court to begin to review immigration cases against 
established constitutional doctrines. 
Justice Scalia’s opinion in Din may provide some indirect support for 
this view. Justice Scalia did not rely on Knauff or any other plenary power 
case. Instead, he questioned whether Din had presented a valid liberty 
interest in the ‘‘right to live in the United States with her spouse.’’33 He 
attacked the Court’s fundamental rights jurisprudence.34 There is no need 
here to review the merits of Justice Scalia’s arguments.35 The point is that 
there is nothing about them that is unique to immigration. Most of Justice 
Scalia’s opinion could have applied to any substantive due process cases in 
which Justice Scalia might have a jurisprudential debate with the four liberal 
Justices. Thus, in Din, the plurality appeared willing to debate an 
immigrant’s fundamental rights (or lack thereof) on similar terms as any 
other fundamental rights case. By contrast, Justice Kennedy explicitly cited 
 
 29. See Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013); Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980 
(2015); see also Silva-Trevino, 26 I&N Dec. 550, 551 (A.G. 2015) (noting the shift to the 
categorical approach). 
 30. E.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012).  
 31. Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and the Supreme Court, 2009--13: A New Era of 
Immigration Law Unexceptionalism, 67 OKL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (concluding that the 
Roberts Court ‘‘has to a large extent continued to bring U.S. immigration law into the legal 
mainstream’’). 
 32. See Cornelia T.L. Pillard & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Skeptical Scrutiny of Plenary 
Power: Judicial and Executive Branch Decision Making in Miller v. Albright, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 
1, 33 (arguing that plenary power did not create alternative constitutional standards for 
immigration but it restrained courts from reviewing immigration laws against established 
constitutional norms). 
 33. Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2131 (plurality opinion). 
 34. Id. at 2134--36. 
 35. For a critique of Justice Scalia’s narrowing of the right to marriage, see Michael 
Kagan, Symposium on Kerry v. Din: Married, But Separated, IMMIGRATIONPROF BLOG (June 
18, 2015), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2015/06/symposium-on-kerry-v-
din-married-but-separated-by-by-michael-kagan.html [http://perma.cc/JQ79-FG3E]. 
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the plenary power doctrine to hold that courts should have a limited role in 
reviewing decisions about granting noncitizens entry into the country.36 
Because of plenary power, Justice Kennedy thought it irrelevant whether Din 
had a bona fide liberty interest.37 But this exceptionalist view of immigration 
attracted the support of only two Justices. 
III. AND YET, PLENARY POWER LIVES ON 
For Justice Kennedy, the most important precedent for Kerry v. Din was 
the 1972 decision in Kleindienst v. Mandel, in which the Supreme Court 
affirmed the government’s authority to refuse a visa to a Belgian journalist 
who described himself as ‘‘a revolutionary Marxist,’’ and who had been 
invited to speak at American universities.38 The Court acknowledged that 
the visa denial impacted freedom of speech and thus allowed that a minimal 
form of judicial review should apply.39 But Mandel required the government 
only to state a ‘‘facially legitimate and bona fide’’ basis for the visa denial,40 
which is a far lower level of scrutiny than would apply in a free speech 
infringement case outside the immigration context.41 Justice Kennedy would 
have extended this logic to infringements on other fundamental rights, such 
as the right to marriage.42 Like the Court in Mandel, Justice Kennedy 
expressed fear the courts could be dragged into every case in which the 
government found a person inadmissible and would be asked to balance the 
would-be immigrant’s interests against the interests of that of the United 
States.43 
It would be tempting to view Mandel as applying only to visa requests 
from outside the country. But it is not entirely clear that this explains the 
Court’s decisions in which fundamental rights conflict with immigration 
enforcement decisions. In Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination 
Committee, the Court allowed Congress to foreclose selective enforcement as 
a defense against deportation of noncitizens inside the United States, even if 
a noncitizen could show that the government was using deportation to 
suppress unpopular political views.44 As a result, it may be a fair reading to 
suggest that the Court has departed from the traditional plenary power 
 
 36. Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2139--40 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 37. Id. at 2140. 
 38. 408 U.S. 753, 756--57 (1972). 
 39. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770. 
 40. See id. 
 41. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015) (‘‘Content-based laws----
those that target speech based on its communicative content----are presumptively 
unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly 
tailored to serve compelling state interests.’’). 
 42. Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2139--41 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 43. Id. at 2140--41 
 44. Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999).  
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doctrine on matters of procedural due process for noncitizens inside the 
United States but that the Court has not yet been willing to apply substantive 
constitutional rights to immigration law.45 
Why might the Court be reluctant to do this? Cases about free speech, 
like Mandel and American-Arab, raise the specter of the government being 
forced to tolerate noncitizens with threatening political views.46 Usually, 
however, it is only a minority of immigrants who come as political activists. 
It is far more common for immigrants to come for family reasons. Thus, 
Din’s claim had far greater implications. Once the Court recognizes that 
immigration exclusions must bend to a citizen’s right to marriage, other 
questions would follow. For one thing, Congress places a quota on spousal 
unification visas for spouses of legal permanent residents.47 Is their right to 
marriage equivalent to that of citizens, and is the quota thus invalid? What 
about other types of family members on which Congress has imposed a 
quota? Do these policies pose a constitutional problem? Even more 
provocative questions are raised if the Court were to apply the Equal 
Protection Clause to immigration. Among other things, Congress has 
imposed a per country quota on family-based immigration.48 In practice, this 
means that some Mexican families must wait thirteen years longer than 
similarly situated families of other nationalities.49 Does this pass 
constitutional muster? The Supreme Court has avoided these questions by 
resisting applying substantive rights to immigration entirely. 
CONCLUSION 
A sober observer would point out that immigration law scholars have 
been predicting the imminent demise of the plenary power doctrine for at 
least three decades.50 In 1995, Legomsky wrote an essay reassessing his own 
predictions for the rapid and dramatic demise of the plenary power. He 
wrote: 
 
 45. See Johnson, supra note 31 (observing that plenary power remains intact with regard 
to substantive rights). 
 46. See Carrie Rosenbaum, Symposium on Kerry v. Din: Kerry v. Din as a Troubling 
‘‘Terrorism’’ and ‘‘National Security’’ Case, IMMIGRATIONPROF BLOG (June 18, 2015), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2015/06/symposium-on-kerry-v-din-kerry-v-
din-as-a-troubling-terrorism-and-national-security-case-by-carrie-r.html 
[http://perma.cc/4DS3-JFFJ]. 
 47. See 8 U.S.C. § 1151(c) (2014) (establishing worldwide numerical limitations on 
family-sponsored immigration). 
 48. 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a) (2014) (setting per country levels of immigration). 
 49. See Visa Bulletin for July 2015, U.S. DEP’T OF ST., (June 9, 2015), 
http://travel.state.gov/content/visas/english/law-and-policy/bulletin/2015/visa-bulletin-for-
july-2015.html [http://perma.cc/H59T-7788] (depicting differential wait times for most 
nationalities and those subject to the per country quota).  
 50. E.g., Legomsky, supra note 17, at 305 (predicting that the Court would ‘‘conclude 
that the time has come to lay the general principle to rest’’); Motomura, supra note 18, at 547--
48 (describing disappointment after the plenary power doctrine was critiqued in the 1980s but 
continued). 
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I expected the dam to burst with a sudden, dramatic 
announcement that, henceforth, immigration cases would be 
treated like any other cases. . . . Obviously, that has not 
happened. . . . [However], a different scenario seems to be in 
progress already. Under this revised scenario, the lower courts 
and the Supreme Court allow the plenary power doctrine to wear 
away by attrition. Little by little, exceptions and qualifications will 
reduce the doctrine to a shadow of its former self without an 
express overruling of contrary precedent.51 
 
Twenty years after that was written, we can note significant progress in 
this war of attrition. On questions of procedural due process, plenary power 
is indeed a shadow of its former self. The Court’s acknowledgement that the 
stakes in a deportation case are at least as high as the stakes in a criminal 
case, coupled with the Court’s recognition in Zadvydas that noncitizens have 
a liberty interest in avoiding detention, provide ample foundation for a top-
to-bottom reassessment of whether the routine procedures of immigration 
enforcement meet due process standards. Recently, lower courts have shown 
increasing discomfort with the routine ways in which noncitizens are 
arrested and detained without an independent finding of probable cause.52 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has extended Zadvydas to 
establish a right to a bond hearing for lengthy prehearing detention of people 
facing removal, even when the Immigration and Nationality Act imposes 
mandatory detention.53 In Din, six Justices were willing to assume that even 
a noncitizen outside the country might have a claim to at least some due 
process. 
We still must wait to see if the Court will push this due process 
revolution to its logical conclusion, and fully treat immigration cases for 
purposes of procedural due process like any other matter with similarly high 
stakes. But even if the Court reaches that remarkable threshold regarding 
questions of procedure, plenary power will remain intact with regard to the 
substance of immigration law. In immigration, Congress remains free to 
discriminate by nationality and by political opinion. Our seminal plenary 
power case----the Chinese Exclusion Case----is known by its explicitly racist 
title. Not only has it never been repudiated by the Court, we have no case law 
 
 51. Stephen Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress, and 
the Courts, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 925, 934 (1995). 
 52. See generally Michael Kagan, Immigration Law’s Looming Fourth Amendment 
Problem, 104 GEO. L. J. (forthcoming 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2568903 [http:// 
perma.cc/3YRL-L9KT]. 
 53. Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1137--38 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that 
Zadvydas requires a bond hearing once pre-order detention lasts beyond six months); Casas-
Castrillon v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 535 F.3d 942, 950 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that prolonged 
detention while a respondent petitions in federal court for review of a removal order requires a 
bond hearing); see generally Farrin R. Anello, Due Process and Temporal Limits on Mandatory 
Immigration Detention, 65 HASTINGS L. J. 363 (2014). 
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suggesting that the original Chinese Exclusion Act is constitutionally 
problematic. To reach such a conclusion, the Court would have to be willing 
to apply Equal Protection analysis to the substance of immigration law, and 
that would potentially raise questions about the validity of a great deal of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act. 
Clearly, there are already four Justices who are ready to apply 
fundamental rights in the context of immigration. If the Court eventually 
takes that step, it will face a choice. It could declare broadly that substantive 
constitutional rights apply in immigration. That would cause the dam to 
break, to borrow Legomsky’s phrase. But history counsels us not to expect 
this. Instead, the Court may be more likely to take one small substantive 
right at a time, much the way the Court began applying the Bill of Rights to 
the states.54 In a sense, the Court already started this process, by announcing 
in Zadvydas that noncitizens have a constitutionally protected right to 
liberty. The question is, what else do they have a right to? 
Expect the war of attrition to continue. 
  
 
 54. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L. 
J. 1193, 1195 (1992) (‘‘A list of cases applying various parts of the Bill of Rights against states 
reads like the ‘‘greatest hits’’ of the modern era . . . .’’). 
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